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Abstract 
 
 It has been shown in previous studies that transaction costs (TC) of agri-environmental 
policy measures often are very large both in absolute terms and as share of payments. As agri-
environmental policy measures make up an increasingly large share of agricultural policies, 
not least within the European Union, it is becoming ever more important to improve the 
knowledge about the factors determining the level of transaction costs. This paper investigates 
the TC determinants of one Swedish agri-environmental policy measure. More specifically, it 
aims to investigate if the level of TC is attributable to economic factors, such as pasture 
density and distances, or if political factors, such as lobby groups and political majorities at 
the county level, influence the costs. To evaluate if the results are robust with respect to 
alterations in model specifications a version of the extreme bounds analysis is applied. 
Although initial results indicate that political parties influence the level of transaction costs, 
the extreme bounds analysis reveals that those results are fragile. It shows that five of the 
economic variables are robust with respect to model specifications but that none of the 
political variables is.  
 
 
Keywords: extreme bounds analysis, agri-environmental policy measures, pasture, transaction 
costs. 
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1. Introduction 
 In the last couple of decades, there has been an increasing number of articles devoted 
to the study of transaction cost economics.1 Although most of the articles have studied the 
issue analytically or discussing the sources and implications of transaction costs (TC) in 
general terms (e.g. Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985; Griffin, 1991; Vatn and Bromley, 1994; 
Stavins, 1995; Challen, 2000, 2001; Vatn, 1998, 2001; Berzel, 1985), there has lately also 
been an increasing number of empirical studies related to agriculture and the environment 
(e.g. Rorstad et al., 2007; McCann, 2000; McCann and Easter, 1999; Falconer et al., 2001; 
Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Mann, 2000).2   
The magnitudes of transaction costs may be important for the development and 
implementation of environmental policy measures. Although traditional price and income 
support programs generally carry relatively small administrative costs, often between 1% and 
5% of the total costs (Falconer and Whitby, 1999, 2000; Vatn, 2002), the level of transaction 
costs has tended to increase as programs have become more focused on supporting positive 
externalities. Since results of previous studies indicate that transaction costs may be sizeable 
(e.g. Rorstad et al., 2007; Falconer and Whitby, 1999, 2000; McCann, 2000), it is important 
to gain a further understanding of the size and determinants of transaction costs. As noted by 
other authors (e.g. McCann et al., 2005), non-negligible transaction costs will affect the 
optimal design of policy instruments as well as the optimal level of payments. Interestingly, 
despite the importance of developing efficient policy measures, relatively little attention has 
been given to the cost-effectiveness of conservation policies (Wätzold and Schwerdtner, 
2005). 
The agri-environmental policy measures are of increasing importance, not least in the 
European Union with the ongoing transfer from commodity related support to area payments 
complemented by payments for non-commodity outputs. Consequently, transaction costs are 
becoming increasingly important to study if efficient policy measures are strived for. This 
paper aims to increase the understanding of what determines the level of transaction costs by 
analyzing how some economic and political factors influence the level of transaction costs. It 
investigates the transaction costs of the Swedish agri-environmental policy measure that aims 
                                                 
1 For a reader presenting original papers and applications, see Williamson and Masten 1999. Shelanski and Klein 
(1995) is a relevant survey on the empirical transaction costs literature. The concept of transaction costs will be 
further in the literature survey, but a general definition of transaction costs due to Arrow (1969, p. 49) is “the 
costs of running the economic system”.    
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to support the qualities of semi-natural pastures. More specifically, it investigates the 
determinants of the county authorities’ costs for setting up maintenance plans for the 
permanent pastures that participate in the system. Although to some extent fulfilling an 
educational function, the costs of creating the maintenance plans could essentially be 
classified as pure transaction costs. The costs per plan vary substantially between the 21 
Swedish counties. Since no apparent reason for the divergence in costs can be easily found, 
the purpose of this paper is to shed further light on the sources of the transaction costs: It aims 
to investigate if the cost divergences could be attributable to reasonably objective economic 
factors, such as pasture density or distance, or if other factors, such as political majorities at 
the county level, influence the costs. Although the farmers’ transaction costs may be 
substantial and are important to consider when developing policy measures (e.g. Falconer, 
2000; Colman, 1994; Morris and Potter, 1995; Ducos and Dupraz, 2006), those transaction 
costs are not investigated in this paper. 
Since very little empirical research has been performed on the determinants of 
transaction costs for agri-environmental policy measures, this paper is exploratory by nature. 
Thus, solid foundations for which variables that should be included in the specifications have 
not always been possible to find. This implies that the foundation for the inclusion of the 
different variables vary. In some cases there are previous studies available, indicating that 
variables such as membership in conservation organizations could be expected to have an 
influence. In other cases there is more of an intuitive reasoning arguing why the variables are 
to be included. The exploratory nature of this paper is one reason for the inclusion of the 
Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA). The essence of the EBA will be further discussed in section 
V.3 of the paper but it could be stated here that it is a suitable method to check if the 
independent variables are robustly related to the dependent variable, or if they are fragile and 
depend on certain specifications to be significant. The method has previously mainly been 
applied to growth studies. 
This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on the determinants of transaction 
costs for the implementation of agri-environmental policy measures. It also applies the EBA 
methodology to a new area, investigating the robustness of political and economic influences 
on the transaction costs of a Swedish agri-environmental policy measure.   
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, the transaction cost 
literature is briefly reviewed with a focus on empirical agricultural and environmental 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 An excellent review and introduction to the field of transaction costs of agri-environmental policy measures is 
OECD (2007). 
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economics. In section three, the part of the Swedish agri-environmental support system that is 
relevant for permanent pastures is described as well as this system's relation to transaction 
costs. In section four the data and the expected relations are presented alongside a set of 
hypotheses. This is followed by the econometric specifications and results in section five. The 
final section presents a summary and the conclusions leading to suggestions for future 
research.  
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2. Literature review 
Although economists always have been aware of the presence and importance of 
transaction costs, transaction costs have only recently begun to be thoroughly studied. The 
seminal article by Coase (1937) showed that with zero transaction costs, the distribution of 
initial property rights does not matter. Interestingly, despite the knowledge that the Coase 
theorem rarely holds, economists have often acted as if there were no transaction costs. The 
reason for why this has been such a common practice is disputed, but the most common 
argument seems to be that transaction costs are difficult to estimate empirically and that it is 
difficult to develop a useful definition that works in most circumstances. Of course, most 
transactions are performed with positive transaction costs but if transaction costs are positive 
and people are utility maximizers, exchanges in the markets will take place when the expected 
resources that must be spent on transaction activities are lower than the expected gains from 
the actual transactions (Fahlbeck, 1995). 
 Coase (1960) also pioneered the works on transaction costs associated with public 
policies. He shows that evaluation of alternative options for addressing externality problems 
should incorporate not only pollution-abatement costs but also transaction costs. Following 
the logic of his argument, it is irrelevant if we are talking about positive or negative 
externalities, the transaction costs should be incorporated in any case.   
 Clearly, transaction costs exist and they may be substantial. The sources of transaction 
costs vary but they could in general terms be described as costs that are linked to activities 
that are associated with exchange. For example, costs are incurred when gathering 
information and establishing contact between agents, writing contracts and control that the 
contracts are fulfilled (Dahlman, 1979).  
 One of the problems of making studies of transaction costs operational is the 
fact that there are no commonly accepted, empirically usable definitions of transaction costs. 
There are however plenty of general definitions. For example, Arrow vaguely defined 
transaction costs as the “costs of running the economic system” (Arrow, 1969, p. 49), whereas 
Gordon (1994) defined it as the expenses of organizing and participating in a market or 
implementing a policy. Thus, as stressed by McCann et al. (2005), one important goal of 
current economists should be to improve transaction cost theory and measurement. 
 According to Williamson (1989) there are three principal dimensions through 
which transactions ought to be analyzed and described. These dimensions are: i) frequency, 
measuring the extent to which transactions are recurrent; ii) uncertainty, indicating the level 
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of risk involved in the transaction; and iii) asset specificity, which if high implies that the 
good involved has few alternative uses or buyers. For example, frequently occurring 
transactions with low uncertainty and low asset specification generally have lower transaction 
costs than transactions where the dimensions are reversed. There may for example be high 
start up costs associated with a policy but once in place the average cost falls over time due to 
recurring transactions and less need for information. This latter point has been supported by 
Falconer & Whitby (1999, 2000) in their studies of the transaction costs incurred in the public 
sector due to the introduction and existence of agri-environmental policies. It could 
furthermore be argued that well functioning institutions may be able to lower transaction costs 
substantially (Bromley, 1989; Hodgson, 1988). Clearly, Williamson (1989) has had a 
profound effect on the literature and it is now very common to structure transaction costs 
studies on the basis of the concepts of frequency, uncertainty and asses specificity. Interlinked 
is the common practice to link the costs to four broad categories: the characteristics of the 
policy, the institutional environment, structural factors and information/coordination systems 
(OECD, 2006).  
 According to Tinbergen (1952), one needs one instrument per desired 
objective. However, the stronger the relations between the different goals, the likelier that 
transaction costs make it optimal to apply fewer instruments than one per objective (Vatn et 
al., 2002). Even if it was possible to develop one instrument per desired goal, it is obvious 
that the process would carry high costs. Consequently, policymakers have had a strong 
tendency to opt for administrative ease and attempted to capture several objectives in each 
policy in order to lower transaction costs. This may be unfortunate, since one of the more 
important issues when developing policies is to strike the right balance between transaction 
costs and precision (Romstad et al., 2000). Just because transaction costs absolutely, or as 
share of expenditures, are higher for some policies than others does not mean that the more 
expensive ones are less efficient. Using specific instruments and policies are likely to involve 
higher transaction costs, but the better precision might lower total costs and create gains that 
far outweigh the transaction costs. 
One part of Peerlings and Polman (2004), concerns transaction costs of policy 
measures for jointly produced milk and ‘wildlife and landscape services’. In a simulation built 
on an empirical study, they examine the effects of reduced farmer variable and fixed 
transaction cost. Not surprisingly, they find that decreasing transaction costs increase 
production of ‘wildlife’. 
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Eklund (1999) has analyzed the transaction costs of the Swedish agri-environmental 
program and presents five hypotheses regarding the foundations of the transaction costs. 
According to her, the following factors influence the transaction costs: i) the character of the 
good; ii) the design of the measures; iii) administrative institutions; iv) the type and degree of 
uncertainty; and v) the frequency of transactions. The factors that seem to have the most 
substantial impact in the case of the Swedish program are the complexity of the kind of goods 
the government intends to promote and the complexity of the design of the policy measures. 
The other factors may however also be important depending on circumstances. The 
transaction costs as share of farmer payments vary between 8% and 17%, depending on 
policy (see Table 1 for a summary of this and the other referenced transaction cost 
estimates).3
Rorstad et al. (2007), investigate the differences between the transaction costs of 
various Norwegian agricultural and agri-environmental policy measures. They attempt to 
measure the total transaction costs as well as the share borne by the farmers involved. Twelve 
policy measures, covering the spectrum from low asset specificity and high frequency to high 
asset specificity to low frequency, are studied. The policy measure that most resembles the 
one studied in this paper is ‘support for special landscape ventures’, which is characterized by 
high asset specificity and low frequency of transactions. The data used in the study was 
collected through interviews with representatives of public administrations, market actors and 
farmers. The main conclusions are that transaction costs, as share of payments, differ 
significantly depending on policy measure and that the point of policy application, asset 
specificity and transaction frequency determine the size of transaction costs. For policies at 
the farm level, TC increase as asset specificity increases. The TC as per cent of payments to 
farmers regarding support for special landscape ventures is 47%. 6% of that cost is borne by 
the farmer.  
In a study by McCann and Easter (1999), the transaction costs of policies aiming to 
reduce agricultural non-point source pollution, more specifically phosphorus pollution in the 
Minnesota River, are investigated. The data was gathered through interviews with 
government officials in an attempt to estimate the costs. Out of the four measures 
investigated,4 it is found that the fertilizer tax has the lowest transaction costs.  
                                                 
3 A study that presents additional estimates including e.g. the share of TC borne by the farmers is OECD (2006). 
4 Fertilizer tax, educational programs, conservation tillage requirement, expansion of permanent conservation 
easement program. 
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McCann and Easter (2000) analyze the size of transaction costs of the US Natural 
Resource Conservation Service’s conservation systems, which partially aim to support 
positive externalities in the agricultural landscape. The data was collected in a nationwide 
survey in 1995 where the costs pertain to technical assistance and cost sharing. They find that 
the transaction costs represent a significant portion of the total conservation costs, 38%. 
Buchli and Flury (2006) investigate the transaction costs of the Swiss agricultural 
direct payment systems. Between the various measures applied in the canton Graubünden, the 
transaction costs as share of payments varies from 0.6% for basic area payments to 16.6% for 
support of extensive production of rapes. The transaction costs are similar in the canton 
Zürich, ranging from 1.0% to 14.2% of payments for the same policy measures.    
In a highly relevant study for this paper, Falconer et al. (2001) explore the 
transaction costs of agri-environmental policy schemes based on management agreements. 
The results indicate that there are efficiencies of scale with respect to the number of 
agreements formed within an area as well as to scheme experience. The data also shows that 
the administration costs as a share of total costs decline over time. In 1992/93, administration 
costs equaled 102% of payments, i.e. TC are higher than actual transfers, but had declined to 
18% in 1998/99,.  
Falconer and Saunders (2002), investigate the public and private transaction costs of 
management agreements on the ‘sites of special scientific interests’, including those under the 
English Wildlife Enhancement Scheme (WES). More specifically, the study was confined to 
the direct costs related to concluding and operating the management agreements. The average 
share of negotiation costs for all types of contracts borne by the administrating agent was 70 
%, the remainder being borne by the farmers. The total negotiation cost was £86 per hectare, 
and £493 per agreement, thus making negotiation costs significant. Transaction costs as share 
of compensation payments for all types of agreements was 21% over the lifespan of the 
contracts. For the WES agreements it was substantially higher though, 113%.  
Mann (2005) investigates the transaction costs of the Swiss agricultural cross-
compliance programs and finds that the transaction costs as share of payments vary widely 
between measures. The TC share for ‘mixed fallow land’ is only 3% whereas the share for 
‘arable field margins’ is 113% although the author argues that the latter is mainly due to the 
small scale, so far, of the program. Also, the transaction costs share in payments for ‘low-
intensity grassland’ was 11%.  
 Vatn et al. (2002), in their report on transaction costs and multifunctionality, 
thoroughly present many of the complexities involved with efficient policy measures in the 
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presence of transaction costs. They also attempt to estimate the transaction costs of a selection 
of Norwegian agricultural policy measures by interviewing representatives from the different 
actors involved in the process. In their study, the policy defined as “support for special 
landscape ventures”, which includes ‘preservation and promotion of biodiversity’, is the 
policy that most resembles the policy investigated in this study. They find that the total 
transaction costs equal about 54% of payments. The local agricultural authorities carry the 
heaviest burden and their share of transaction costs is 85% of the total transaction costs. 
  
Table 1: Transaction cost estimates.  
 
Source Objective Estimate  When Where 
Mann 2005 Low intensity grassland 11% Not specified Switzerland 
OECD 2005 Ecological compensation (Grisons/Zürich) 6.8%/7.6% 2003 Switzerland 
Rorstad et al. 
2007 Special Landscape Ventures 47% 2001/03 Norway 
Vatn et al. 
2002 Special Landscape Ventures 54% 2000 Norway 
Falconer & 
Saunders 2002 Wildlife Enhancement Schemes 113% 1996 UK 
Falconer et al. 
2001 Management agreements 
102% 
18.1% 
1992/93 
1998/99 UK 
McCann & 
Easter 2000 
Natural Resource Conservation Service 
programs 38% 1995 USA 
Eklund 1999 Preservation of biodiversity 13.5% 1997 Sweden 
- Ibid Preservation of cultural heritage 16.5% 1997 Sweden 
- Ibid Preservation of open landscape 8.3% 1997 Sweden 
Falconer & 
Whitby 1999b Ecologically valuable area scheme 10.3% 1996/97(a) Austria 
- Ibid Eco-point scheme 18.4% 1996/97(a) Austria 
- Ibid E. Flanders willows scheme 66.4% 1996 Belgium 
- Ibid Conversion to extensive grassland 53.4% 1995/96(a) France 
- Ibid Maintain local species 137.9% 1995/96(a) France 
- Ibid Valuable nature and cultural environment 8.3% 1997 Sweden 
- Ibid Biodiversity in pastures 13.5% 1997 Sweden 
- Ibid Open landscape 8.3% 1997 Sweden 
- Ibid Environmentally sensitive areas 24.6% 1996 UK 
- Ibid Countryside stewardship 37.9% 1996 UK 
- Ibid Habitat scheme 50% 1996 UK 
N.B. (a) denotes average of the two years. Otherwise multiple years denotes that the data is gathered in those years. The 
percentage number under "estimate" refers to share of payments made to the farmers except for McCann and Easter (2000) 
where it refers to share of total costs. 
 
One study that covers several agri-environmental policies in a European context has 
been performed within the STEWPOL project and is reported in Falconer and Whitby 
(1999b). The transaction cost estimates of 37 schemes in 8 countries are investigated and the 
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11 ones that are the most relevant for the purposes of this paper are presented in Table 1. In 
the study, the focus was placed on the public sector and only the direct organizational costs of 
the schemes were estimated.  Given the diversity of both scale and objectives, it is not 
surprising that the magnitude of transaction costs varies substantially between countries and 
between policies. Two general conclusions that are drawn in the study are that transaction 
costs seem to decline with time as administrators become accustomed with the programs and 
also that fixed initial costs may be very important and a large share of total transaction costs. 
The general tendency seems to be that transaction costs are high when agricultural 
positive externalities are supported. This may be true in absolute terms, but is nearly always 
the case when costs are estimated as share of payments. Some studies indicate that transaction 
costs may decrease with time. These facts have some specific implications on the Swedish 
administrative costs. Firstly, since the agri-environmental policy measures have gone through 
a series of changes since they were introduced, it is quite likely the transaction costs are 
higher than they would have been, had the system not been altered. However, hopefully the 
more recent policy measures achieve the policy goals more efficiently, thus overcoming the 
cost disadvantages that are due to policy alterations. More important is the fact that 
transaction costs tend to be of substantial magnitudes. Since the agricultural policy measures 
are becoming more and more focused on the reimbursement of public good production, the 
share of payments as well as the absolute amounts devoted to the policies are likely to 
increase. Thus, it will become increasingly important not to ignore the transaction costs if 
efficiency is strived for. 
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3. The Swedish pasture support system and transaction 
costs. 
Internationally, and also within the European Union, there is a wide spectrum of agri-
environmental policy measures in place, ranging from simple measures that are close to 
standard area payments with low TC to very sophisticated and detailed measures with very 
high TC. The Swedish pasture support system fits somewhere in the range of middle to high 
transaction costs, including many farmers and pastures but being fairly detailed and time 
consuming in the initial phase. Within the EU, there are some examples of measures that are 
similar to the Swedish measures (e.g. the British ESA and Higher Level Stewardship 
schemes) and it is quite likely that measures of this kind will become even more common as 
the EU common agricultural policy becomes increasingly focused on the production of 
environmental public goods. As such, it is a good example of a policy that is relevant to study 
and the results will give insights and knowledge about important aspects of future policy 
development, not only for EU members but also for other, third countries. Thus, this section 
discusses the Swedish pasture support system and the chain of transaction costs and 
institutions that affects the policy development and implementation process. Initially, the 
County administrative boards and the maintenance plans will be appropriately placed in the 
network of transaction costs. Thereafter, the maintenance plans and specification of 
transaction costs for the purposes of this study will be more thoroughly discussed. 
A stylized framework identifying the most important actors and actions with respect 
to production, implementation and decision making is presented in Figure 1. As can be seen, 
there are many specific items in the chain ranging from decision to fulfilled production. What 
makes the maintenance plan section special, is that it directly affects the marginal cost of 
production. Thus, the creation of the maintenance plan does not necessarily have to be seen as 
the final step in the policy implementation process, but can rather, or also, be seen as the first 
step of the policy execution stage.  
In Figure 1, the actions taking place are being shown in boxes and the most 
important actors are displayed in ellipses. The EU Commission develops the general 
framework for the policy and communicates it to the national level. The framework is being 
adapted to national demands and a national suggestion is presented to the commission that 
either rejects or accepts the suggestion. Once the national policy is in place, the policy is 
communicated to the county administrative boards and the farmers. The farmers have to 
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devote time and resources to informing themselves and applying for payments. Finally, the 
county administrative boards have to create the maintenance plans and verify that the farmers 
fulfill the requirements.  
In order not to crowd the figure with various graphics, additional links have not been 
included. All actors are for example monitored by other actors: the farmers are monitored by 
the county administrative boards, which are monitored by the Swedish Board of Agriculture, 
which is monitored by the EU Commission. The EU Commission is in turn not an 
independent entity but is being monitored by the EU Parliament, the national parliaments and 
governments, OLAF5 etc.  
 
Figure 1: Transaction costs chain. 
 
Increasing levels of policy specificity and implementation 
Policy execution 
Policy implementation 
 
Although not explicitly displayed, transaction costs occur between and within all the 
actors in the figure. Out of all these ‘within’ and ‘between’ transaction costs, only one is 
investigated in this paper, the creation of maintenance plans. As mentioned above, what 
makes this entity particularly interesting from a policy perspective is that it directly affects the 
marginal costs of policy implementation. Thus, if efficient policy measures are strived for, the 
                                                 
5 The EU anti-fraud office. 
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policy makers’ implementation costs at the farmer level are of the utmost importance. If these 
costs are ignored, too much resources will be devoted to the policy based on any utility 
maximization or efficiency criteria. 
The Swedish county administrative boards essentially consist of administrators that 
are appointed by the central government.6 Their main task is to function as the central 
government’s administrator at the local level, handling the implementation of national 
policies in the counties. That includes e.g. handling applications for driving licenses and 
administration of agricultural support and agri-environmental policy measures. Since the 
county administrative boards are not elected but centrally appointed, they should not be 
influenced by local political majorities or preference formations at the county level. Neither 
should they be affected by the influence of interest groups since any implementation of policy 
that diverges from the norm decided by the central government would imply a breach with the 
boards’ mandate. In essence, the boards should fulfill the tasks given to them by the central 
government efficiently and fairly. 
In Sweden, the holders of semi-natural pastures can apply for compensation to 
maintain the pastures' specific qualities.7 There is one basic payment of 1100 SEK/ha (about 
120 €/ha) that all semi-natural pastures are granted, irrespectively of biological or aesthetical 
values, as long as some basic measures are fulfilled. If the pastures are deemed to be of 
special importance from a biological or cultural point of view, the holders may apply for an 
additional payment of 1400 SEK/ha (about 150 €/ha). However, in order to get the payment, 
the pasture has to be maintained in accordance with certain site-specific conditions. When a 
farmer has applied for the payment, an expert from the country administrative board visits the 
farmer, investigates the pastures and sets up, ideally together with the farmer, a maintenance 
plan for the pasture. The maintenance plan is thus a prerequisite for the implementation of the 
desired policy measure. 
The maintenance plan contains certain stipulated conditions regarding the 
maintenance of the pasture that the farmer has to fulfill or he risks losing the payment. The 
plan can be quite detailed with respect not only to the types of objects that are included in the 
plan but also to how detailed the directives for each object is. A common example is 
directives stating that the area surrounding a specific solitary tree should be completely 
                                                 
6 For a map of Sweden with the location of the counties presented, see . Appendix 1
7 The system described here was in effect between the years 2000 and 2006. Betweem the years 1995 and 2000, 
a similar system was in place (see Swedish Board of Agriculture (2000) for a description of the rules governing 
that system) where farmers signed contracts covering five years. The high adaption rate in the first two years of 
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cleared from other vegetation, or exactly where in a field bushes of a certain specie are 
allowed. It is therefore possible that two experts that each visits a randomly chosen farmer 
could produce somewhat different plans. Consequently, it is also possible that some county 
administrative board experts generally produce more costly plans than others.  
Two factors that are the cost bases that determine the costs of the maintenance plans 
are transportation and labor costs, where the former generally is a fraction of the latter and 
depends on the distance between the office and the farmer.8 The major costs is the labor cost 
for the time the administrator spends at the farm investigating the pasture and talking to the 
farmer in addition to the time spent at the office typing the actual report.9  
 The costs of creating the maintenance plans could reasonably be considered a 
relatively pure transaction cost. Usefully for our purposes, between the years 2000 and 2003 
the county administrative boards did not have to commit resources from their ordinary 
budgets for the creation of the maintenance plans. Rather, during these years the Boards could 
request funds from the project KULM10 to cover their expenses. This procedure has two major 
implications. Firstly, it implies that explicit data is accessible regarding the costs for the 
creations of the maintenance plans. Secondly, it also implies that the local Boards did not 
necessarily have strong incentives to keep down the costs for the Plans as they were 
reimbursed for their expenses anyway. The Boards could thus to some extent follow agendas 
other than those decided by the government. The Boards could for example encourage the 
administrators to spend additional time on the plans and with the farmers in order to improve 
networks, increase farmer knowledge or simply make the plans more detailed in order to 
increase pasture performance. As has been shown in previous studies, bureaucrats sometimes 
influence the policy process (e.g. Miller, 2004; Wilson, 1989; Rourke, 1984). It has for 
example been suggested that local labour market conditions and unemployment levels 
influence regulators strategies (e.g. Dion et al., 1998; Gray & Deily, 1996) and that 
membership levels in conservation organizations affect enforcement decisions (Firestone, 
2002). Likewise, it is commonly so that at higher income levels environmental quality tends 
to increase (e.g. Dinda, 2004). Then, if the administrative costs of a particular choice of the 
administrator does not influence the administrators' budgetary expenses, it would be even 
more reasonable that the bureaucrats utilize their potential powers.      
                                                                                                                                                        
the new program (see ) is reasonable since a high fraction of the farmers with pastures fulfilling the rules 
signed contracts in 1995 and 1996. 
Table 2
8 It normally consists of some costs for car transportation and the labour time needed to travel the distance. 
9 Cost differences between counties may to some extent depend on the allocation of overhead costs. 
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As Table 2 clarifies, the transaction costs vary substantially between the counties and 
between years.11,12 It may be the case that these cost divergences have valid foundations that 
could be empirically verified. It may for example be that case that high transaction costs 
reflect long distances between the central local government and the affected farmers. It could 
also be the case that some counties have a large share of relatively small pastures that 
increases costs whereas others have large pastures that decrease costs.      
 
Table 2: descriptive statistics of transaction costs at county level, SEK/plan.  
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003
Average 5237 4493 4962 5375
st dev 1117 1684 1869 2329
Max 7523 7398 8042 12126
Min 3410 570 759 565
No of plans 6680 11278 2526 1699
NB: SEK/plan, current prices. Conversion rate about 9.5SEK/€, July 2007.  
 
On the other hand, given the substantial magnitude in differences, we can not a 
priori assume that the economic factors are the main foundations for the transaction cost 
divergences. Rather, a reasonable hypothesis is that other, political, factors influence the size 
of transaction costs. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Swedish full policy name: ”Kompetensutveckling av lantbrukare inom miljöområdet”. English, own 
translation: ”Farmer environmental competence development”. 
11 Appe  presents more thorough statistics for the transaction costs, specifying the transaction costs for each 
county and year.  
ndix 2
Appendix 2
12 It should be noted that the in  reported Min values for 2001 through 2003 refer to Z county and diverge 
substantially from the min values of the other counties. The second lowest min value is 2377SEK for U county 
in 2003. Please see  for further details.  
Table 2
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4. Expected relationships and data description 
In the previous discussion, it has been argued that transaction costs should depend on 
factors that are unavoidable and may depend on factors that should not influence the level of 
transaction costs. An example of the latter is a common preference formation at the local level 
that induces administrators to spend resources on activities that the central administrators 
have not previously planned for. That may result in different levels of transaction costs 
spending between counties. In the following, the unavoidable factors that reasonably should 
affect transaction costs will be referred to as economic factors whereas the factors that should 
not affect the level of transaction costs will be referred to as political factors. For clarity, the 
expected relationships and stated hypotheses presented below have been grouped under these 
headings.   
 
Economic variables 
 
Naturally, total transaction costs should increase with the number of maintenance 
plans created by the Boards. However, it is also reasonable to expect some efficiencies of 
scale in the number of plans that are created. If many plans are created in a given county, it 
may be possible to use resources more efficiently as slack could be avoided. Likewise, it is 
probable that if many plans are created, the people creating the plans become more efficient. 
These assumptions would imply that an increasing number of maintenance plans created 
would increase total transaction costs but decrease transaction costs per plan. These effects 
are captured by data on the number of maintenance plans created (PLAN) and the same 
variable squared (PLAN2). These assumptions would imply that the variable PLAN would be 
positive as TC increase with increasing number of plans, but that PLAN2 would be negative 
because of efficiencies of scale.  
The creation of maintenance plans necessarily imply some physical visits of the 
county boards' administrators to the farmers applying for the payments. Thus, some of the 
costs for the creation of the maintenance plans will be related to costs of transportation. Large 
distances contribute to transaction costs not only by the pure travel costs, but also through the 
cost increases incurred by time being spent on transportation rather then productive work. 
Since there are large differences in size between the Swedish counties (for some reference 
about the relative sizes, see the map of Sweden in Appendix 1), the effect of transportation 
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costs could possibly explain some of the differences in TC, an effect that should be possible 
to capture through an indicator on the size of a county (CSIZE).  
A variable that should work in the opposite direction of CSIZE is the variable PGNO 
that measures the number of pastures in a county. The argument is that the presence of many 
pastures in a county implies that they are closer to one another than they are if there are few 
pastures. Thus, many pastures in a specific county could decrease transaction costs be 
lowering the time spent on transportation between pastures. 
An important aspect that should effect the magnitude of the transaction costs is the 
actual size of the pastures. Basically, the larger the pastures, the higher transaction costs could 
be expected to be. The argument is simply that larger pastures tend to consume more of the 
Boards’ staffs’ time as it will take longer time to accurately investigate the qualities of the 
pastures and set up the maintenance plans. Two alternative indicators are used as to capture 
the effect, the average size per pasture, aPGSIZE, and the total county pasture size, PGSIZE.  
The share of total pasture area that is deemed to be of high quality13, QUAL, is used 
as a proxy for the quality of the land.14 The effect could work in two directions. One effect of 
high quality land could be that costs increase since the plans need to be more elaborate in 
order to account for the richness and complexities of the lands. On the other hand, the effect 
of poor quality lands could be an increase in costs since the previous degradation of the lands 
imply that the plans need to be more elaborate. The reason for this is that the plans have to be 
more detailed in order to specify the maintenance works that need to be fulfilled for the 
pastures the fulfill the requirements. 
Finally, it should be expected that transaction costs are affected by a time factor. 
With time, efficiency should increase as the administrators get more accustomed to their 
tasks. Thus, it is reasonable to expect time to have a negative effect on the level of transaction 
costs. The time effect of organizational learning that is expected to occur in the Boards is 
captured by the three time dummies y2001, y2002 and y2003. 
  
                                                 
13 A pasture is included as a high quality pasture if it has been specified so in Swedish Board of Agriculture 
(2005a). To be included, the pasture should be used exclusively for grazing and not be suitable for ploughing. 
The general criterion for being regarded as a 'high quality' pasture is that the pasture is 'valuable', implying that 
the pasture has high nature- and/or culture-environmental values. Most of these pastures are semi-natural. See 
Swedish Board of Agriculture (2005b) for a detailed explanation of the inventory methodology. 
14 Le Goffe (2000) argues in a study on hedonic pricing of agricultural and forestry externalities that the share of 
permanent grassland to total surface area can be used as an indicator for the extensiveness of the agricultural 
system, where more extensive systems are supposed to be more respectful of hedgerows, soil and water quality. 
He finds the indicator to be significant, as do Bontemps et al. (2007) in their study on hedonic pricing and 
agricultural non-point source pollution when similarly using the share of permanent grassland that has been 
converted into cultivated pastures.  
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Political variables 
 
A large population, POP, in a county could imply that there is a high demand for 
public goods. If that is the case, it may be the case that additional time is devoted to the 
maintenance plans in order to make the pastures more aesthetically attractive from a user 
perspective. Such efforts should then increase costs. It could however be the case that the 
population size per se has a minor affect, but that the population density POPDEN, is 
important.    
Local politics could possibly influence the transaction costs because of 
unemployment levels. Since someone else pays for the staff, the Boards may have incentives 
to hire more people than necessary to fulfill the task in an attempt to improve the employment 
situation. The indicator used for employment is share of working age population that is 
unemployed, UNEMP.  
Drawing on the environmental Kuznets curve literature, a test is performed to see if 
income, INC, has some kind of effect on the transaction costs. The link could then be that 
with increasing income beyond a certain level, increasing demand for public goods leads to 
more resources being devoted to the creation of maintenance plants in order to improve the 
performance of pastures. Two variables that sometimes capture the same effect, the average 
age of the population, AGE, and the education level (measured as the share of the population 
that has at least three years of university education) EDU are also included in the dataset. 
The literature on lobby groups and their influence on policy outcome is now 
substantial and it is undeniably so that lobby groups sometimes manage to affect the policy 
process. In this study, the question of interest is whether lobby groups influence the 
implementation of policy. The argument in this context is that the stronger the lobby group in 
the county, the higher the expressed demand for public goods. The share of the population 
that is member of Swedish Society for Nature Conservation15 (SSNC), LOBBY, is used as an 
indictor for lobby influence. If a high share of the population is member of SSNC, there may 
be high demands on the efforts of the Boards to create thorough plans. That would in turn 
increase the transaction costs.        
Occasionally, the population expresses their preferences through the procedure of 
voting at the municipality level. Even though local politics should not affect the county 
administrative boards, it is still possible that there is some link and influence between the 
                                                 
15 Swedish: “Svenska Naturskyddsföreningen”. 
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composition of political parties in a county and the policy process. Local political 
configurations could affect the transaction costs by influencing the atmospheres in the 
counties and displaying implicit demands on the Boards’ activities.16 That could especially be 
expected to be the case for two types of parties. Firstly, there are the parties that claim to be 
more environmentally friendly than others. A higher influence of those parties could increase 
costs as the Boards devote more time to the maintenance plans. In Sweden, the liberal Center 
Party (CP) and the left wing Green Party (MP) are the two parties that traditionally are 
associated with environmental friendliness. Secondly, there are the parties that follow a fairly 
conservative agenda, in the case of Sweden the Christian Democrats (KD). A conservative 
agenda could in the framework of agriculture be a preference for traditional pastoral 
landscapes. As the semi-natural pastures that the maintenance plans aim to promote are 
important aspects of these landscapes, one hypothesis is that conservatives wish to promote 
resources to the maintenance plans. The above mentioned parties could be expected to have 
an effect on the policy implementation at the margin in a county. In addition to the above 
mentioned parties, the party configurations left wing block (LWB) and right wing block 
(RWB) are also tested for influence.17 The variables for political influence are defined as the 
share of voters favoring a particular party or party configuration.  
 
Data availability 
 
The econometric estimates in this paper rely on the availability of panel data for all 21 
Swedish counties. The transaction cost estimates are data from the Swedish Board of 
Agriculture, which is the institution wherefrom the County administrative boards retrieve the 
money used for the creation of the maintenance plans. The data on the area of high quality 
pastures that is used in the indicator QUAL is from Swedish Board of Agriculture (2005). The 
data on membership in the non-government organization Swedish Society for Nature 
Conservation has been received from its central office in Stockholm. All other data have been 
retrieved from Statistics Sweden. The data covers the four year period 2000-2003 and the data 
is balanced, implying that there is a total of 84 observations.   
 
                                                 
16 Thus, the elections and political configurations should in the context of this paper primarily be seen as 
preference expressions (cp. Kahn, 2007). 
17 The RWB is defined as the combined votes on the Center Party, the Liberal Party, the Conservatives and the 
Christian Democrats; the LWB is defined as the combined votes on the Left Party and the Social Democrats.  
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Table 3: List of variables 
 Var Description Unit availability 
 TC Transaction costs SEK 2000-2003 
     
PLAN Number of maintenance plans created Number 2000-2003 
PLAN2 Number of maintenance plans created squared Number 2000-2003 
CSIZE County size Km2 Constant 
PSIZE County pasture size of high quality Ha Constant 
aPSIZE Average county pasture size of high quality Ha Constant 
PGNO Number of high quality pastures Number Constant 
QUAL Share of total pasture area that is of high quality Percent Constant 
Y2001 Time dummy for year 2001 dummy - - 
Y2002 Time dummy for year 2002 dummy - - 
E
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Y2003 Time dummy for year 2003 dummy - - 
     
POP Size of population Number 2000-2003 
POPDEN Population density Number 2000-2003 
UNEMP Unemployment rate Percent 2000-2003 
INC Income per capita 1000 SEK 2000-2003 
AGE Average age of the population Year 2000-2003 
EDU Share of population with at least three years of university education Percent Constant 
LOBBY Share of pop that is member of SSNC Percent Constant 
KD Share of voters voting on Christian Democrats Percent 1998 & 2002 α
MP Share of voters voting on Green Party (leftist)  Percent 1998 & 2002 α
CP Share of voters voting on Center Party (liberal) Percent 1998 & 2002 α
RWB Share of voters voting on Right Wing Block Percent 1998 & 2002 α
P
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LWB Share of voters voting on Left Wing Block Percent 1998 & 2002 α
α Implying that the election result of 1998 covers the years 2000 - 2001, and that the election result of 2002 covers the years 
2002 - 2003. 
As indicated in Table 3, data is continuous for the dependent variable and seven of 
the independent variables. Seven of the variables are assumed constant over the period but in 
reality may the variables PSIZE, aPSIZE, PGNO and EDU have experienced some minor 
changes. Likewise, the variable LOBBY is not constant in reality as the number of members 
in SSNC is likely to have varied to some extent over the years. Data for this variable is 
however available only for 2002 and since changes over the period are likely to be relatively 
small, the variable is assumed constant in this paper. The indicator for landscape quality, 
QUAL, is also assumed constant event though some minor changes may have occurred over 
the period. The pastures were surveyed with respect to quality in the period 2002 – 2003. The 
period 2000 - 2003 covers two election periods as there was one election in 1998 and one in 
2002. This implies that the result of the first election expresses preferences covering the 
period 2000 - 2001 and the second election the years 2002 - 2003. The election data is 
municipality votes that are aggregated to the county level.  
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5. Econometric specification and results 
In order to give the analysis a good structure, this chapter is split into four sections. It 
begins with an initial discussion where the expected relationships from the previous chapter 
are summarized and possible econometric specifications discussed. Then, in section two, 
some initial estimations are performed by pooling the data and utilizing the standard OLS 
procedure. Although section two presents some interesting results, the analysis does not rest 
there. Due to the exploratory nature of this paper, an extreme bounds analysis is also 
performed in order to test whether the results are robust with respect to model specification. 
The EBA method is presented in section three along with some previous EBA applications 
where after the results of the EBA are presented in section four.  
 
5.1. Initial discussion 
 
If the administrators at the county administrative boards were indeed some kind of 
ideal bureaucrats in the Weberian sense, transaction costs would be expected to be a function 
of a set of economic factors. They would thus be a function of the number of maintenance 
plans, the size of the county, the size of the pastures and the quality of the pastures in addition 
to other economic factors: 
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A more realistic administrator may possibly be affected by political factors in addition to the 
economic factors. Examples of such factors may be lobby groups and local politics. An 
adjusted function for transaction costs could thus look as follows: 
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A complete econometric specification then takes the following form:  
 
tiiititititiTC ,,,,, εηβα +⋅+⋅+= zx   i=1,…,21 t=2000,…,2003  (3) 
 
where  is a vector of the independent variables that vary in both time and space, and  is 
a vector of independent variables that are constant over the years but vary between counties. 
ti,x iz
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Since the data consists of a short panel (T=4) with relatively few observations in space 
(N=21), it is not possible to estimate all coefficients.  
With a sufficient number of observations over time for each county it would be 
possible to estimate a separate regression for each county of the following form: 
  
titiiitiTC ,,, εβα +⋅+= x   i=1,…,21 t=2000,…,2003   (4) 
 
However, since there are only four time periods, that is not possible. What may be estimated 
is however a specification where the parameters are constant across individuals at a given 
time, but can vary over time. In that case, a separate regression can be postulated for each 
cross section:  
 
tititttiTC ,,, εβα +⋅+= x   i=1,…,21 t=2000,…,2003   (5) 
 
Now, since all Swedish counties are investigated, a natural first suggestion for the 
empirical analysis would be to utilize the fixed effects model. The objection to that approach 
is however that it is necessary to incorporate the variables that are constant over time in the 
estimation, and thus the fixed effects model can not be utilized. A less obvious estimation 
procedure is to utilize the random effects model. Although it may seem unlikely that the 
random effects model would be an appropriate model since the investigated counties cover all 
Swedish counties, the model could still be appropriate due to omitted variables in the error 
component. Bresuch and Pagan (1980) present a Lagrange multiplier test for the random 
effects model based on the OLS residuals to find out if it is an appropriate model despite the 
presumptions that it is not. Regardless of which independent variables that are included in the 
analysis, the results of the tests indicate that the random effects model is not appropriate. 
Another possible method that could be used to perform the estimation would be the 
between effects model. In that case though, the data for each county is averaged over the 
years and the estimation results can thus not describe any changes over time. Even if it is 
deemed suitable to ignore possible changes over time, the between effects model still 
produces relatively poor results and thus does not present a feasible estimation alternative.  
 
 
 
 
 27
5.2. Initial specifications 
 
A remaining option is to pool the data and perform a simple OLS analysis.18 In doing so, it is 
possible to test if time affects the transaction costs by implementing time dummies. The 
empirical specification then takes the form:  
 
tiititi DDDTC ,200332002220011,, εγγγηβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= zx    i=1,…,21  t=2000,…,2003 (6) 
 
Where, as previously, α is a constant, xi,t is a vector of independent variables that vary with 
time and over space, zi is a vector of independent variables that are constant over time but 
vary between countries and Dt are dummies capturing the learning process occurring over 
time. Initially, the Breusch-Pagan (Breusch and Pagan, 1979)19 test is performed to test for 
heteroscedasticity in the sample and the test reveals that there is heteroscedasticity in the 
sample. Thus, the regressions need to be adjusted for heteroscedasticity, something that in the 
following is done by applying the weighted least squares procedure and using the variable 
PLAN as weight.20,  21
Six regressions of this form are displayed in Table 4,22 each of them containing seven 
economic variables in addition to the political variables. The fundamental economic variable 
is PLAN, joined by PLAN2 to capture the scale effect. The variable PLAN should reasonably 
have a substantial effect as it expected to drive the level of transaction costs. The variables 
PGSIZE and QUAL are likewise expected to be significant, the former because of the link 
between higher inventory needs and the latter due to previous empirical studies. The empirical 
literature also indicates that there may be significant learning effects that occur over time and 
therefore the time dummies are included in all regressions. The possible influence of 
preferences are captured through the inclusion of i) the voter preference variables for 
                                                 
18 For a discussion on whether or not it is appropriate to pool the data, see Baltagi (2000). 
19 The test is also called the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and Cook-Weisberg. The test was originally derived, 
and published, independently by Breusch and Pagan (1979), Godfrey (1978) and Cook and Weisberg (1983). 
20 The variable PLAN has been used as analytical weight because preliminary test results indicate that the 
heteroscedasticity is proportional to that variable. When the regressions are heteroscedasticity adjusted through 
the weighting procedure, the coefficient of determination increases substantially and the B-P test comes out 
negative. It will be seen later in the EBA analysis that the use of PLAN as weight comes in very handy as it is 
the only independent variable that is present in all EBA regressions. 
21 Greene (2007) presents the logic behind the modification well: "The logic of the computation is that 
observations with smaller variances receive a larger weight in the computations of the sums and therefore have 
greater influence on the estimates obtained." (Ibid, p. 168). 
22 Several additional combinations of variables have been regressed but are omitted here due to space constraints.  
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individual parties (sKD, sMP, sCP); ii) the political block variables (LWB, RWB); and iii) the 
lobby group membership variable (LOBBY).23   
 
Table 4: OLS tests for Model specifications. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PLAN 2509.2 (3.23**) 
2968.0 
(3.88**) 
2766.4 
(3.71**) 
2810.0 
(3.71*) 
3615.5 
(4.60**) 
2439.6 
(3.27**) 
PLAN2 0.190 (0.36) 
-0.123 
(0.24) 
0.075 
(0.15) 
-0.046 
(0.09) 
-0.397 
(0.78) 
0.212 
(0.43) 
PSIZE 53.7 (9.64**) 
56.0 
(9.61**) 
50.5 
(8.45**) 
57.3 
(10.17**) 
53.5 
(9.69**) 
55.6 
(10.42**) 
QUAL -2 241 408 (6.55**) 
-2 553 605 
(7.87**) 
-2 163 595 
(6.14**) 
-2 413 773 
(7.51**) 
-2 587 264 
(8.45**) 
-2 181 130 
(6.72**) 
Y2001 131 114 (0.92) 
159 303 
(1.09) 
118 484 
(0.83) 
172 059 
(1.19) 
114 546 
(0.81) 
148 167 
(1.07) 
Y2002 -859 412 (4.24**) 
-848 336 
(4.07**) 
-961 354 
(4.61**) 
-878 315 
(4.27**) 
-739 616 
(3.60**) 
-1 018 137 
(4.95**) 
Y2003 -818 237 (3.25**) 
-765 477 
(2.98**) 
-867 576 
(3.42**) 
-799 490 
(3.15**) 
-625 881 
(2.46*) 
-957 878 
(3.79**) 
sCD 4 437 326 (2.02*)      
sLOBBY  -5 633 318 (0.22)     
sGP   -15 897 862 (2.18*)    
sCP    -2 011 153 (1.59)   
sLWB     2 800 243 (2.39*)  
sRWB      3 490 257 (2.92**) 
Constant 829 411 (2.75**) 
1 272 425 
(2.28*) 
1 851 118 
(4.62**) 
1 345 590 
(4.86**) 
-270 205 
(0.42) 
-1 211 549 
(1.43) 
Obs 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Adj R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
* denotes significant at 5% level; ** denotes significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 Five of the economic variables appear to be significant regardless of which other 
variables that are included in the regression. The two variables PGSIZE and PLAN have the 
expected signs: clearly, transaction costs increase with the number of plans that are created. 
Likewise, it appears that larger pastures imply higher transaction costs. Regarding the variable 
QUAL, it was previously argued that the standard of the landscape could drive costs in either 
                                                 
23 In addition, the demographic characteristics variables (INC, AGE, EDU, POPDEN, UNEMP) have also been 
tested, jointly and individually. None is significant and are not presented here due to space constraints. 
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direction. It does appear though that transaction costs are lower where the share of semi-
natural pastures is large in relation to the share of cultivated pastures, implying that a high 
quality of pastures decrease the costs. In addition to the three aforementioned variables, the 
time dummies for 2002 and 2003 are highly significant. The variables are large and negative, 
indicating that the county administrative boards do become more efficient over time, resulting 
in reduced transaction costs. The intercept is significant in four cases, all of which are 
positive.  
Regarding the political variables, four of the variables are significant at the five or 
one percent level. It appears as if the Christian Democrats, the Left Wing Block and the Right 
Wing Block increase transaction costs, whereas the Green party decreases transaction costs. 
That a high presence of votes for the environmental party decreases transaction costs is rather 
surprising as the opposite would have been expected. It may further be of interest to note that 
even though the variables for the Center Party and Lobby are not significant (although the 
Center party is almost significant at the 10% level), the coefficients for those are highly 
negative as well. Thus, it may be the case that a high prevalence of environmental preferences 
in a county results in less resources being spent on transaction costs whereas a high 
preference for other political sympathies results in more resources being spent on 
transactions. 
Although the results are interesting, not particularly inconclusive and the regressions 
evidently capturing a large share of the variability (the adjusted R2 is 0.93 – 0.94 in all 
regressions) it would be appealing to strengthen the results further. Since this paper is 
exploratory, it is desirable to establish if the parameters are robust with respect to model 
specifications. Therefore, in order to improve the strength of the results and especially 
establish if the political variables indeed are robust, and extreme bounds analysis will be 
performed. The EBA methodology is discussed in section 5.3 and the results of the analysis 
are presented in section 5.4.    
 
5.3. Testing for Robustness, Extreme Bounds Analysis 
 
The methodology used above with the testing of several alternative specifications 
with various independent variables is a common practice in several scientific fields, 
particularly those where theory is not always perfectly guiding the choice of model 
specification or variable inclusion. Often authors suggest a more or less wide range of 
variables that are considered to (possibly) have an impact on the dependent variable. The 
 30
procedure is then commonly one of two alternatives. The process either begins with the 
broadest possible specification, which then through a series of tests is limited by piecewise 
discarding of variables that fail to satisfy some (predetermined) criteria. Contrasting to this 
bottom-up method is the top-down method where the process begins with a limited set of 
variables where after variables are tested and added to the specification if they pass the test. 
Both procedures are clearly unsatisfactory as they essentially are ad hoc procedures that could 
lead to inclusion of different variables depending on e.g. the order of the tests. The results of 
studies attempting to investigate a specific phenomena sometimes differ substantially and 
many authors do not offer thorough analyses of the sensitivity of their conclusions with 
respect to model specifications. The problem becomes especially acute when theory does not 
guide the econometrics thoroughly. That is for example still a long-standing problem with 
econometric research in the field of growth theory. Likewise, the border area of transaction 
costs economics and political economics also leaves the field open to some ad hoc 
formulations regarding which variables that should be included in studies. 
Over the years some alternative methods that could limit the above mentioned 
problems have evolved. In this paper, one version of the extreme bounds analysis originating 
with Leamer (1978), and subsequently discussed in Leamer and Leonard (1982) and Leamer 
(1983, 1985), will be utilized. Previous applications of the EBA have been related to growth 
theory, as in e.g. Levine and Renelt (1992), Temple (2000), Sturm and Haan (2005), 
Radulescu and Barlow (2002), Pitlik (2002) and Fölster and Henrekson (2001); but also to 
corruption studies (Serra 2006), determinants of intra industry trade (Torstensson, 1996) and 
foreign direct investment (Chakrabarti, 2001) as well as trade creation in the presence of 
regional trade arrangements (Ghosh and Yamarik, 2004). Leamer (1983) exemplified the 
methodology with an empirical application to the suggested deterrent effects of capital 
punishment. Common to all these studies is that there is a discussion in the research 
community whether or not various factors influence the dependent variable in a certain 
direction. In the growth literature, for example, a very wide range of factors have been 
suggested to contribute to, or damage, economic growth (see e.g. Durlauf and Quah (1999) 
for an overview of variables that have been suggested). In short, the central difficulty, which 
also applies to this study, is that many different models may seem reasonable given the data 
but yield different, or even opposite, conclusions about the parameters of interest. 
The basic idea laying the foundation for the extreme bounds analysis is that the 
researcher has an idea on some variables that definitely should be included in an analysis. 
These variables are commonly called free variables. The reason why the researcher believes 
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those variables should be included in the regressions could for example be due to prior 
empirical consensus in the research community or a solid theoretical foundation. In addition 
to the free variables there are also some variables that the researcher considers to be doubtful. 
One reason why the variables may be doubtful is that prior empirical investigations have 
shown inconclusive results. In our case, the EBA then uses an econometric specification of 
the following form:  
 
μγβωα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= jjjjj ZFMTC              (7) 
 
Where the dependent variable TC is, as previously, transaction costs, M is the variable that 
always is included in the regressions, in our case the number of maintenance plans created 
(PLAN),24 F is the variable of interest and NZ j ∈  is a vector of up to three doubtful 
variables taken from the pool N of doubtful variables that may be related to the dependent 
variable, and μ is the error term.25 To apply the EBA, the specification is regressed for all 
possible combinations of  resulting in a total number of 1140 combinations.NZ j ∈ 26 The 
extreme bounds test is applied on the variable F and for each model j one finds an estimate βj 
and a standard deviation σj. The EBA criteria are as follows: If the lower extreme bound for β, 
which is equal to the lowest value for βj achieved in any of the regressions minus two standard 
deviations (minβj-2σj), is negative, whereas the upper extreme bound for β, which is equal to 
the highest value for βj achieved in any of the regressions plus two standard deviations 
(maxβj+2σj), is positive, then the variable F is considered to be fragile, i.e. not robustly related 
to TC. If, on the other hand, the lower extreme bound and the upper extreme bound share the 
same sign, then the variable F is considered to be robust. Henceforth, this criterion will be 
referred to as the strong EBA criterion. 
The criterion above is indeed very stringent as it implies that if there is one 
regression where the sign of the coefficient β changes, then the variable F is not considered to 
be robust. The criterion has been the focus of e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1994, 1997a,b) and Granger 
                                                 
24 In most previous studies utilizing the EBA method more than one M variable is included. This study diverges 
from those in that respect but for good reasons since it is reasonable to argue ex ante that only the variable PLAN 
must be included.    
25 The decision to use three doubtful variables is of course arbitrary but the main rationale for choosing three Z 
variables and not more is to limit multicolinearity problems (e.g. Leamer and Leonard (1982)). Furthermore, 
with time it has become the standard practice to use three variables. I have experimented with the two and four Z 
variables as well, but that does not particularly change the results.    
 32
and Uhlig (1990) who both criticize the criterion on the grounds that it is too stringent. The 
main criticism by Granger and Uhlig is that the extreme values may come from combinations 
of variables that most economists would find unreasonable. They consider this problem by 
defining R2-max as the R2-value that is achieved by running a regression using all the free and 
doubtful variables at the same time. Then, it might be the case that the extreme bounds arise 
from variable combinations that achieve R2-values very much lower than R2-max and that 
those combination may be considered irrelevant because of the poor goodness-of-fit. Their 
suggestion is to rank the R2-values achieved and include the rank in the presented statistics, 
thereby allowing a continuum of choices between Leamer’s extreme bounds (any R2) and 
classical econometrics (R2-max). Sala-i-Martin’s (1997a,b) suggestion is similar insofar as he 
also suggests that it may be unreasonable to discard variables just because a single regression 
(out of possibly hundreds) fails to be significant with the right sign. Instead, he suggests that 
the variables of interest F should be ranked according to the share of variable combinations of 
Z that display significant regression results. Then one could set a weaker criterion allowing 
less than 100% of the regressions being significant with the right sign. This suggestion will be 
taken into account by following e.g. Fölster and Henrekson (2001) and Serra (2006) and 
presenting the fraction of regressions that are significant at the 5% level. Henceforth, this 
criterion will be referred to as the weak EBA criterion.  
Another objection to the EBA procedure is that the initial structuring of variables into 
the M and Z vectors are somewhat arbitrary. It could thus be questioned if it is not so that one 
ad hoc procedure has been exchanged for another. However, most researchers would probably 
agree that often we can be rather sure that some variables do influence the dependent variable 
substantially while we with good reason can be more uncertain of the effect of others. There 
is furthermore no apparent reason why standard model selection procedures, as stated by 
Temple (2000), should not be allowed to be applied in advance to identify the most relevant 
variables. Furthermore, in the case of this paper, there is indeed one variable that most 
certainly has an effect on transaction costs, namely the number of plans created (PLAN). With 
good reason, all other variables may be considered doubtful. 
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5.4. Extreme Bounds Analysis, Results 
 
Although there are strong reasons to believe that the M variable is robust and always 
should be included in the regressions, it may still be reasonable to perform an EBA on that 
variable as presented in Table 5 in order to verify that the M variable indeed is robust. 
 
Table 5: EBA, M variable 
 
Table EBA HW=PLAN on var PLAN 
 
F var Coef t-val P-val Z-var  Sign (%) ROB 
Min 3065 12.56 0.00 PGSIZE, y2002, y2003 - 0  
PLAN   0.00  Σ 100 R 
Max 7108 7.59 0.00 PLAN2, INC, sLWB + 100  
 
For each F variable there are three rows. The upper/lower rows labeled Min and Max display the 
lower/upper extreme bound for the variable F. The upper and lower extreme bound coefficients 
are displayed with (absolute) t-values and p-values. For each F variable there are three 
values in the column Sign. The upper(lower) value denotes the share of regressions that is 
negative(positive) and significant at the 5% level. The center value is the total share of 
regressions that is significant, irrespective of sign. Note that the numbers in the "Sign" 
column may not add up due to rounding. The column labeled Z denotes the variables that result 
in the lower/upper extreme bounds. R/F denotes if the variable F is Robust (R) or Fragile (F). 
 
Evidently, since 100% of the 1330 regressions performed are robust, the variable PLAN 
clearly fulfills the EBA criteria and is robustly related to transaction costs.  
The results of the EBA analysis of all doubtful variables is presented in Appendix 3. 
Very few of the regressions could be classified as robust and as a matter of fact, none of the 
variables fulfills the strong EBA criterion whereas only 2 of the 21 variables satisfy the weak 
EBA criterion. The first of these variables, aPGSIZE, is positive and significant in 96.9% of 
the 1140 regressions run. The implication is that if the average pasture size in a county is 
large, then the transaction costs increase, essentially implying that cost per plan increases 
when average pasture size increases. The other variable that passes the weak EBA criterion is 
PGNO with 96.8% of the regressions being negative and significant. It thus does appear that 
if there are many pastures in a county, transaction costs decrease. The reason for this should 
be that if pastures are close to one another, staff transportation costs will decrease. None of 
the political variables is significant.27  
 In the preceding section, one important aspect has not been taken into account. As can 
be seen in the correlation matrix in Appendix 5 there is a high degree of correlation between 
some particular variables. For example, the correlation between QUAL and PGSIZE is 0.65. 
                                                 
27 It should be mentioned though that two of the political variables are fairly close. The coefficient for MP is 
negative and significant in 85% of the regressions and the coefficient for KD is significant and positive in 
86.7%. Since the variables do not pass neither the weak nor the strong EBA criterion, the results are not further 
commented upon here, but the variables may be interesting to keep in mind for further research.  
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Often, a high level of correlation tends to decrease the robustness of the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables when additional independent variables that are 
(highly) correlated with the dependent variable are included. In order to decrease the 
multicollinearity problem, I follow the suggestion by Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) and condition 
the F variables by a 0.5 correlation criterion and rerun the EBA. Thus, for each F variable, the 
Z variables that have an (absolute) correlation higher than 0.5 with the F variable are 
discarded.  
The results of the multicollinearity adjusted EBA are presented in Appendix 4, which 
follows the structure of Appendix 3 however with an additional column indicating which 
variables that are excluded because of the correlation criterion. Now, the M variable PLAN 
still passes the strong EBA criterion28, and the variables aPGSIZE and PGNO still pass the 
weak EBA criterion.29 In addition, two new variables pass the strong EBA criterion. These are 
PLAN2 and PGSIZE, which are both positive. The variable PGSIZE essentially captures the 
same effect as aPGSIZE, i.e. the larger the pastures the higher the transaction costs per plan. 
The finding that PLAN2 is positive is somewhat surprising though. On the other hand, the 
coefficient is very low (the upper extreme bound has a value of only 3.4). 
To summarize the EBA results, the extreme bounds analysis does not verify the 
robustness of all the variables that came out as significant in the initial analysis. Indeed, all 
the political variables are fragile according to both the strong and weak EBA criterion. In 
addition to that, the variable measuring the general quality of pastures, QUAL, is not robust. 
Likewise, it appears as if the organizational learning process captured by the time dummies 
was only apparent. When the EBA analysis is performed, the time dummies become fragile.  
                                                 
28 And the regressions resulting in the extreme bounds display substantially lower p-values. 
29 For the latter two, the robustness increases as a larger share of the regressions are significant with the right 
sign.  
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6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
This paper has investigated the determinants of the transaction cost related to the 
Swedish agri-environmental policy measure for maintenance of pastures. The originating 
hypothesis was that two different set of factors influence transaction costs, economic factors 
and political factors. It was argued that the economic factors should influence transaction 
costs as these are factors that the administrators can not really affect. It was also argued that, 
given the large variation in costs between countries, there may be other, political, factors that 
influence the transaction costs although they should not. In order to test the hypotheses, 
heteroscedasticity adjusted OLS regressions of various specifications were initially 
performed. These preliminary results indicated inter alia that political configurations at the 
local level might influence the level of transaction costs. It appeared for example that counties 
where a relatively large fraction of voters voted on the Green party had lower transaction 
costs than those where a large fraction voted on either Christian Democrats, the left wing 
block or the right wing block.  
In order to test if these results were robust or not, a modified extreme bounds 
analysis was performed. In the EBA, all the political variables came out fragile, leaving only a 
set of five economic variables robust. The results showed that the free variable, i.e. the 
number of maintenance plans created, clearly influenced the level of transaction costs. In 
addition to that, the size of the pastures had the expected influence; the larger the pastures, the 
higher the level of transaction costs. One of the economic variables, the number of existing 
pastures in a county, contributed to decreases in transaction costs. An explanation for this 
could be that if there are many pastures in a county, the pastures tend to be closer to one 
another, thus reducing transaction costs.  
 To conclude, it appears as if level of the transaction costs investigated in this paper are 
not related to political factors but only to economic factors and that administrators at the 
county levels are not unduly affected by local politics and public preferences. As far as is 
possible to tell from this study, the county administrators seem to behave as Weber's ideal 
bureaucrats. The reader should finally be reminded that it is a very specific share of the total 
transaction costs of the agri-environmental policy measures related to pasture maintenance 
that has been investigated in this paper. Although being highly important for implementation 
purposes and cost-efficiency, the entire chain of transaction costs should preferably be 
investigated. That task is however left to later research. 
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Appendixes: 
 
Appendix 1: Map of Sweden with county locations. 
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Appendix 2: TC statistics. 
 
County  2000 2001 2002 2003 
Stockholms, AB Tot / Avr TC 443448 / 4183 1468986 / 4913 423588 / 5648 366280 / 7793 
 No plans 106 299 75 47 
Uppsala, C Tot / Avr TC 1087793 / 3442 1700751 / 3848 351232 / 3193 332602 / 3823 
 No plans 316 442 110 87 
Södermanlands, D Tot / Avr TC 1874979 / 5403 1897205 / 4791 498621 / 4841 391671 / 4663 
 No plans 347 396 103 84 
Östergötland, E Tot / Avr TC 2520208 / 4453 5180012 / 4600 729720 / 3475 929471 / 3659 
 No plans 566 1126 210 254 
Jönköping, F Tot / Avr TC 1862967 / 6900 4074820 / 4307 1025754 / 6978 549887 / 5728 
 No plans 270 946 147 96 
Kronoberg, G Tot / Avr TC 2772279 / 4659 1710660 / 5002 341682 / 5891 252488 / 4856 
 No plans 595 342 58 52 
Kalmar, H Tot / Avr TC 4706659 / 6412 6369621 / 5728 1266127 / 4292 793832 / 4642 
 No plans 734 1112 295 171 
Gotland, I Tot / Avr TC 1161044 / 4161 3167565 / 2575 507081 / 5122 449756 / 5766 
 No plans 279 1230 99 78 
Blekinge, K Tot / Avr TC 1636353 / 6417 1938487 / 2951 629125 / 2255 319272 / 4434 
 No plans 255 657 279 72 
Skåne, M Tot / Avr TC 3647484 / 5744 4965794 / 3929 1475154 / 3242 820523 / 6312 
 No plans 635 1264 455 130 
Halland, N Tot / Avr TC 1573587 / 5142 2505233 / 3983 618412 / 6310 455518 / 6327 
 No plans 306 629 98 72 
Västra Götaland, O Tot / Avr TC 4018838 / 4051 5202114 / 4353 1070004 / 5095 1236552 / 5888 
 No plans 992 1195 210 210 
Värmland, S Tot / Avr TC 554535 / 6524 873501 / 6878 152793 / 8042 119120 / 7941 
 No plans 85 127 19 15 
Örebro, T Tot / Avr TC 967464 / 5560 1618856 / 5582 389890 / 5734 297096 / 4792 
 No plans 174 290 68 62 
Västmanland, U Tot / Avr TC 740000 / 3410 672091 / 3537 130700 / 2420 109352 / 2377 
 No plans 217 190 54 46 
Dalarna, W Tot / Avr TC 638254 / 4872 1114645 / 6797 397782 / 6314 77004 / 2962 
 No plans 131 164 63 26 
Gävleborg, X Tot / Avr TC 306815 / 5114 2530154 / 7398 413078 / 7944 318736 / 6782 
 No plans 60 342 52 47 
Västernorrland, Y Tot / Avr TC 789486 / 5981 319010 / 1697 219748 / 6104 339534 / 12126 
 No plans 132 188 36 28 
Jämtland, Z Tot / Avr TC 1158566 / 5266 77567 / 570 24284 / 759 28804 / 565 
 No plans 220 136 32 51 
Västerbotten, AC Tot / Avr TC 717461 / 4751 726441 / 4779 267523 / 5460 283545 / 5907 
 No plans 151 152 49 48 
Norrbotten, BD Tot / Avr TC 820000 / 7523 312900 / 6135 71265 / 5090 127155 / 5528 
 No plans 109 51 14 23 
Source: Swedish Board of Agriculture. 
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Appendix 3: Results of extreme bounds analysis. 
F var Coef t p Z  Sign R/F 
Min -2.40 3.65 0.00 UNEMP INC BEFTAT - 66.8  
PLAN2     Σ 66.8 F 
Max -0.29 0.55 0.58 aPGSIZE KD y2002 + 0  
Min 3.78 0.55 0.58 aPGSIZE LOBBY EDU - 0  
PGSIZE     Σ 88.4 F 
Max 54.51 7.22 0.00 aPGSIZE PGNO y2003 + 88.4  
Min -1.53e+05 3.18 0.00 PGNO UNEMP PGSIZE - 1.5  
aPGSIZE     Σ 98.4 R 
Max 2.24e+05 6.40 0.00 LWB Alder  EDU + 96.9  
Min -129.40 6.76 0.00 QUAL POP C - 96.8  
PGNO     Σ 96.8 R 
Max -8.58 0.70 0.48 KD CSIZE  aPGSIZE + 0  
Min -2.94e+06 7.29 0.00 POP BEFTAT PGSIZE - 36.5  
QUAL     Σ 48.2 F 
Max 2.02e+06 3.72 0.00 POP KD PGNO + 11.8  
Min -9.22 1.79 0.08 LWB PGSIZE QUAL - 0  
CSIZE     Σ 11.0 F 
Max 19.68 3.20 0.00 C RWB PLAN2 + 11.0  
Min -4.49E+05 2.48 0.02 EDU LWB aPGSIZE - 0.4  
AGE     Σ 45.6 F 
Max 7.41E+05 5.22 0.00 LOBBY EDU KD + 45.3  
Min -3.36E+05 1.63 0.11 LWB Y2002 aPGSIZE - 0  
UNEMP     Σ 31.4 F 
Max 9.74E+05 5.37 0.00 LOBBY KD Y2003 + 31.4  
Min -1.29E+05 3.90 0.00 LOBBY C BEFTAT - 34.5  
EDU     Σ 35.9 F 
Max 1.61E+05 4.00 0.00 KD Y2002 AGE + 1.4  
Min -9.79E+03 2.37 0.02 POP LOBBY MP - 0.7  
INC     Σ 3.7 F 
Max 2.01E+04 2.69 0.01 BEFTAT PLAN2 UNEMP + 3.0  
Min -1.14E+04 3.34 0.00 POP aPGSIZE INC - 6.8  
BEFTAT     Σ 7.2 F 
Max 5518.9 2.04 0.04 KD C LWB + 0.4  
Min -0.60 3.67 0.00 C PGSIZE QUAL - 1  
POP     Σ 7.8 F 
Max 0.58 2.26 0.03 EDU PLAN2  BEFTAT + 6.8  
Min -1.02E+7 0.38 0.71 PGSIZE aPGSIZE PGNO - 0  
sLOBBY     Σ 68.5 F 
Max 2.15E+08 6.29 0.00 MP UNEMP EDU + 68.5  
Min -9.86E+04 0.03 0.97 MP y2002 LOBBY - 0  
sKD     Σ 86.7 F 
Max 1.81E+07 6.11 0.00 AGE UNEMP EDU + 86.7  
Min -5.64E+07 4.68 0.00 C RWB LOBBY - 85.0  
sMP     Σ 85.0 F 
Max 1.29E+0 1.27 0.21 aPGSIZE Alder KD + 0  
Min -8.38E+06 4.21 0.00 PGSIZE EDU LOBBY - 9.9  
sC     Σ 24.6 F 
Max 1.32E+07 3.72 0.00 RWB LWB POP + 14.6  
Min -5.64E+06 1.69 0.10 aPGSIZE KD C - 0.1  
sRWB     Σ 52.2 F 
Max 1.42E+07 4.91 0.00 CSIZE UNEMP C + 52.1  
Min -2.43E+06 1.20 0.23 PGNO QUAL AGE - 0  
sLWB     Σ 34.0 F 
Max 6.81E+06 3.27 0.00 BEFTAT KD C + 34.0  
Min -4.74E+05 2.03 0.05 Y2002 INC BEFTAT - 5.4  
Y2001     Σ 5.6 F 
Max 3.30E+05 2.04 0.04 PGSIZE QUAL INC + 0.2  
Min -1.07E+06 4.58 0.00 Y2003 PGSIZE RWB - 39.5  
Y2002     Σ 39.5 F 
Max -2.13E+04 0.09 0.93 KD UNEMP LOBBY + 0  
Min -9.77E+05 3.57 0.00 PGSIZE RWB Y2002 - 3.2  
Y2003     Σ 3.2 F 
Max 2.90E+05 0.88 0.38 PLAN2 QUAL LWB + 0  
For each F variable there are three rows. The upper/lower rows labeled Min and Max display the 
lower/upper extreme bound for the variable F. The upper and lower extreme bound coefficients 
are displayed with (absolute) t-values and p-values. For each F variable there are three 
values in the column Sign. The upper(lower) value denotes the share of regressions that is 
negative(positive) and significant at the 5% level. The center value is the total share of 
regressions that is significant, irrespective of sign. Note that the numbers in the "Sign" 
column may not add up due to rounding. The column labeled Z denotes the variables that result 
in the lower/upper extreme bounds. R/F notes if the variable F is Robust (R) or Fragile (F). 
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Appendix 4: Results of extreme bounds analysis, multicollinearity adjusted. 
F var Coef t p Z Excluded   Sign R/F 
Min 3547.6 18.55 0.00 aPGSIZE Y2002 Y2003  - 0  
PLAN     PLAN2, PGSIZE, y2001  Σ 100 R 
Max 4509.2 22.97 0.00 PGNO C LWB  + 100  
Min 1.92 10.68 0.00 PGSIZE Y2002 Y2003  - 0  
PLAN2     PLAN,  Σ 100 R 
Max 3.37 13.75 0.00 PGNO POP Y2001  + 100  
Min 17.84 2.84 0.01 PLAN2 LOBBY MP  - 0  
PGSIZE     PLAN, aPGSIZE PGNO Σ 100 R 
Max 85.42 9.13 0.00 C KD RWB QUAL + 100  
Min 4.78E+04 1.27 0.21 UNEMP LOBBY MP  - 0  
aPGSIZE     PGSIZE  Σ 99.9 R 
Max 2.24E+05 6.40 0.00 LWB AGE EDU  + 99.9  
Min -80.13 5.78 0.00 CSIZE C 2001  - 97.5  
PGNO     PGSIZE QUAL Σ 97.5 R 
Max -8.58 0.70 0.48 aPGSIZE KD CSIZE  + 0  
Min -1.26E+06 3.64 0.00 aPGSIZE C LWB  - 31.9  
QUAL     PGSIZE PGNO  Σ 31.9 F 
Max 2.56E+05 0.56 0.58 CSIZE KD RWB  + 0  
Min -4.13 0.59 0.56 PGNO BEFTAT POP  - 0  
CSIZE     LWB Σ 12.9 F 
Max 19.68 3.20 0.00 PLAN2 C RWB  + 12.5  
Min -1.02E+05 1.12 0.27 PGSIZE UNEMP MP  - 0  
AGE     EDU BEFTAT POP LWB  Σ 48.8 F 
Max 4.94E+05 5.00 0.00 LOBBY C 2001  + 48.2  
Min -2.52E+05 1.33 0.19 AGE aPGSIZE Y2002  - 0  
UNEMP     LWB Σ 34.7 F 
Max 9.74E+05 5.37 0.00 LOBBY KD Y2003  + 34.7  
Min -1.26E+05 4.09 0.00 CSIZE LOBBY C  - 37.9  
EDU     AGE INC BEFTAT POP Σ 37.9 F 
Max 3.86E+04 1.79 0.08 PGSIZE KD LWB  + 0  
Min -9.10E+03 2.18 0.03 QUAL LOBBY RWB  - 1  
INC     EDU BEFTAT POP Σ 2.5 F 
Max 8451.49 2.05 0.04 AGE Y2001 Y2002  + 1.5  
Min -4.30E+03 2.87 0.01 QUAL APGISZE LOBBY  - 4.9  
BEFTAT     AGE EDU INC POP C  Σ 5.2 F 
Max 4021.5 2.49 0.01 PGSIZE KD LWB RWB + 0.3  
Min -0.43 2.97 0.00 QUAL PGSIZE RWB  - 1.8  
POP     AGE EDU INC BEFTAT  Σ 3.5 F 
Max 0.33 2.15 0.03 PGSIZE PLAN2 LWB C + 1.8  
Min -1.02E+07 0.38 0.71 PGSIZE PGNO aPGSIZE  - 0  
sLOBBY     LWB Σ 63.7 F 
Max 2.15E+08 6.29 0.00 EDU UNEMP MP  + 63.7  
Min -9.86E+04 0.03 0.97 MP y2002 LOBBY  - 0  
sKD      Σ 86.7 F 
Max 1.81E+07 6.11 0.00 AGE UNEMP EDU  + 86.7  
Min -5.64E+07 4.68 0.00 C RWB LOBBY  - 85.0  
sMP      Σ 85.0 F 
Max 1.29E+06 1.27 0.21 aPGSIZE Alder KD  + 0  
Min -8.38E+06 4.21 0.00 LOBBY EDU PGSIZE  - 13.2  
sC     BEFTAT POP RWB Σ 22.1 F 
Max 5.05E+06 2.70 0.01 UNEMP PGNO CSIZE  + 8.8  
Min -5.64E+06 1.49 0.10 APGSIZE C KD  - 0.1  
sRWB     BEFTAT  Σ 49.2 F 
Max 1.42E+07 4.91 0.00 C UNEMP CISZE  + 49.1  
Min -1.78E+06 1.00 0.32 EDU QUAL PGNO  - 0  
sLWB     CSIZE AGE UNEMP  Σ 41.2 F 
Max 6.81E+06 3.27 0.00 C KD BEFTAT LOBBY + 41.2  
Min -4.74E+05 2.03 0.05 Y2002 INC BEFTAt  - 5.4  
Y2001      Σ 5.6 F 
Max 3.30E+05 2.04 0.04 PGSIZE QUAL INC  + 0.2  
Min -1.07E+06 4.58 0.00 Y2003 PGSIZE RWB  - 39.5  
Y2002      Σ 39.5 F 
Max -2.13E+04 0.09 0.93 KD UNEMP LOBBY  + 0  
Min -9.77E+05 3.57 0.00 PGSIZE RWB Y2002  - 3.2  
Y2003      Σ 3.2 F 
Max 2.90E+05 0.88 0.38 PLAN2 QUAL LWB  + O  
For each F variable there are three rows. The upper/lower rows labeled Min and Max display the  
lower/upper extreme bound for the variable F. The upper and lower extreme bound coefficients 
are displayed with (absolute) t-values and p-values. For each F variable there are three 
values in the column Sign. The upper(lower) value denotes the share of regressions that is 
negative(positive) and significant at the 5% level. The center value is the total share of 
regressions that is significant, irrespective of sign. Note that the numbers in the "Sign" 
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column may not add up due to rounding. The column labeled Z denotes the variables that result 
in the lower/upper extreme bounds. R/F notes if the variable F is Robust (R) or Fragile (F). 
* Despite high correlation, PLAN has not been excluded in this regression since it is an 
essential variable. 
               
 
Appendix 5: Correlation Matrix. 
 
 
 
 
  TC      PLAN     PLAN2    PGSIZE   aPGSIZE PGNO   QUAL     CSIZE    Alder    UNEMP    EDU    INC      BEFTAT   POP   sLOBBY 
        
TC  1.0000 
PLAN  0.9474  1.0000 
PLAN2  0.8861  0.9571   1.0000 
PGSIZE  0.5447  0.5077   0.4558   1.0000 
aPGSIZE  0.2913  0.2374   0.1857   0.5241   1.0000 
PGNO  0.2051  0.2834   0.2905   0.5581  -0.2156  1.0000 
QUAL  0.2032  0.2563   0.2263   0.6475   0.2496  0.7451   1.0000 
CSIZE -0.2209  0.2358  -0.1530  -0.2975  -0.1229 -0.2613  -0.3208   1.0000 
Alder -0.1419 -0.1793  -0.1239  -0.0034  -0.0553 -0.0553  -0.0872   0.1667   1.0000 
UNEMP -0.1491 -0.1933  -0.1299  -0.1775   0.0630 -0.2089  -0.1056   0.3740   0.4703   1.0000 
EDU  0.0139  0.0598   0.0448  -0.0464   0.1880 -0.1190  -0.0218   0.0132  -0.8475  -0.2787  1.0000 
INC -0.1329 -0.1362  -0.1102  -0.1603   0.0754 -0.2297  -0.2613  -0.2046  -0.4773  -0.2319  0.5913  1.0000 
BEFTAT  0.0678  0.0725   0.0523   0.0131   0.2230 -0.0745  -0.0516  -0.3164  -0.5791  -0.2135  0.6524  0.8782   1.0000 
POP  0.2124  0.2035   0.2044   0.1126   0.2172 -0.0877  -0.1810  -0.1102  -0.5364  -0.1196  0.6377  0.7260   0.8335  1.0000 
sLOBBY  0.1290  0.1230   0.0657   0.1851   0.1343  0.0020  -0.0126  -0.4188  -0.4796  -0.4363  0.4160  0.3649   0.3573  0.2970   1.0000 
sKD  0.3045  0.2349   0.1599   0.1281  -0.0204 -0.1234  -0.1281  -0.3289  -0.1904  -0.4433 -0.1388  0.0076  -0.0238  0.0261   0.1278 
sMP -0.0574  0.0263   0.0294  -0.0824  -0.2466  0.2674   0.1907   0.0145  -0.2246   0.0193  0.2430 -0.0181   0.0465  0.0735   0.3041 
sC -0.0161 -0.0053   0.0211   0.2045  -0.1942  0.3977   0.1216   0.0340   0.4158  -0.1170 -0.4713 -0.4675  -0.5104 5163   0.1395  -0.
sRWB  0.0963  0.0588   0.0116  -0.0080   0.2496 -0.3381  -0.0585  -0.4400  -0.3961  -0.1608  0.3696  0.4678   0.5194  0.4589   0.0961 
sLWB -0.3207 -0.3483  -0.2859  -0.3185  -0.0835 -0.3153  -0.0779   0.5326   0.6120   0.6059 -0.3928 -0.3815  -0.4969 -0.4350  -0.5728 
y2001  0.4626  0.5126   0.4785   0.0000  -0.0000  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  -0.0300  -0.1488  0.0000  0.0123  -0.0009 -0.0010   0.0045 
y2002 -0.2927 -0.2700  -0.2224   0.0000  -0.0000  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0414  -0.2690  0.0000  0.0587   0.0009  0.0007   0.0004 
2003 -0.3412 -0.3440  -0.2482   0.0000   0.0000  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1078   0.2323  0.0000  0.1888   0.0028  0.0027  -0.0083 
 
 
sKD sMP sC sRWB sLWB y2001 y2002 y2003 
         
sKD 1.0000 
sMP -0.3976 1.0000 
sC -0.1184 0.0220 1.0000 
sRWB 0.4792 -0.2967 -0.7375 1.0000 
sLWB -0.3002 -0.0324 -0.1040 -0.1591 1.0000 
y2001 0.0406 0.0914 -0.0303 -0.0540 0.0003 1.0000 
y2002 0.0406 0.0914 -0.0303 -0.0540 0.0003 -0.3333 1.0000 
y2003 -0.1217 -0.2742 0.0909 0.1619 -0.0008 -0.3333 -0.3333 1.0000 
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